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We study a bifurcation problem for a system of two differential
equations in implicit form. For each value of the parameter θ , the
solution yields a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies in feedback
form, for a non-cooperative differential game. When θ = 0, the
second player has no power to inﬂuence the dynamics of the
system, and his optimal strategy is myopic. The game thus reduces
to an optimal control problem for the ﬁrst player. By studying
the bifurcation in the solutions to the corresponding system
of Hamilton–Jacobi equations, one can establish existence and
multiplicity of solutions to the differential game, as θ becomes
strictly positive.
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1. Introduction
Aim of this paper is to study a bifurcation problem for a system of two implicit ODE’s, of the form
{
Gξ ′ + θ2αη′ = φ,
βξ ′ + Gη′ = ψ. (1.1)
Here all functions are allowed to depend on x, ξ,η, and on the parameter θ . However, when θ = 0, we
assume that Gη ≡ φη ≡ 0 and hence the ﬁrst equation can be solved independently. Our main goal is
to analyze the existence and multiplicity of solutions for θ > 0, in a neighborhood of a singular point
where G = φ = 0.
E-mail address: bressan@math.psu.edu.0022-0396/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jde.2009.11.025
1298 A. Bressan / J. Differential Equations 248 (2010) 1297–1314Our interest in the above problem is motivated by the analysis of non-cooperative differential
games. Consider a system with dynamics
x˙ = G(x,u1,u2). (1.2)
Here x ∈ Rn is the state of the system, u1 and u2 are the controls implemented by the two players,
while the upper dot denotes a derivative w.r.t. time. The goal of each player is to minimize his own
cost functional, exponentially discounted in time:
J i
.=
∞∫
0
e−ρt Li
(
x(t),u1(t),u2(t)
)
dt, i = 1,2. (1.3)
In the special case of zero-sum games with L1 ≡ −L2, an extensive mathematical theory is now
available [1,9,11]. Indeed, these problems can be studied by looking at the value function, characterized
as the unique viscosity solution to a scalar Hamilton–Jacobi equation.
The theory of non-zero-sum games, on the other hand, is far less developed. We remark that,
in this case, not even the concept of solution is straightforward. Motivated by the classical work of
Nash [13] on non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, we adopt here a similar concept.
Deﬁnition 1. A pair of feedback controls x → (u∗1(x),u∗2(x)) provides a non-cooperative equilibrium
solution to the differential game (1.2)–(1.3) if the following hold.
(i) The control u∗1(·) is an optimal feedback, in connection with the optimization problem for the
ﬁrst player:
minimize
∞∫
0
e−ρt L1
(
x,u1,u
∗
2(x)
)
dt, subject to x˙ = G(x,u1,u∗2(x)).
(ii) The control u∗2(·) is an optimal feedback, in connection with the optimization problem for the
second player:
minimize
∞∫
0
e−ρt L2
(
x,u∗1(x),u2
)
dt, subject to x˙ = G(x,u∗1(x),u2).
Throughout this paper, we shall always work with feedback controls u∗1,u∗2 smooth enough so
that the resulting ODE x˙ = G(x,u∗1(x),u∗2(x)) has a unique solution, for every initial data. Under suit-
able regularity conditions, the corresponding value functions for the two players satisfy a system of
Hamilton–Jacobi equations:
ρVi = H (i)(x,∇V1,∇V2). (1.4)
Systems of this form are highly non-linear and hard to study. The examples studied in [4,14] already
show the complexity of the problem. It is worth mentioning that, for a game on a ﬁnite time in-
terval and with terminal cost, the corresponding Cauchy problem for the value function can be ill
posed [5,6]. Apart from [7], most of the existing literature on non-cooperative differential games is
concerned with linear dynamic and quadratic cost functionals [2,15]. In this case, the value functions
can always be found within the set of quadratic polynomials.
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method, was recently proposed by the author in [3]. The original problem (1.2)–(1.3) is embedded
in a family of problems, depending on a parameter θ ∈ [0,1], namely
x˙ = G1(x,u1, θ)+ θG2(x,u2, θ). (1.5)
The cost functionals are also allowed to depend on θ . We assume that they take the form
J i =
∞∫
0
e−ρt
(
Li1(x,u1, θ) + Li2(x,u2, θ)
)
dt, i = 1,2. (1.6)
Here θ is regarded as the strength of the second player. When θ = 0, this player cannot inﬂuence in
any way the evolution of the system. His optimal strategy is thus the myopic one:
u2 = u†2(x) = argmin
ω
L22(x,ω,0). (1.7)
The non-cooperative game reduces to an optimal control problem for the ﬁrst player, namely
minimize
∞∫
0
e−ρt
(
L11(x,u1,0)+ L12
(
x,u†2
(
x(t)
)
,0
))
dt, (1.8)
for a system with dynamics
x˙ = G1(x,u1,0). (1.9)
Having determined the optimal feedback control u∗1(x) for the ﬁrst player, one can then compute the
trajectories of the system, and hence the value function for the second player.
On the other hand, as soon as the parameter θ becomes strictly positive, we have a genuine
differential game. Our main interest is to understand how the solution of the optimal control problem
for θ = 0 can provide useful information about Nash equilibrium solutions to the differential game for
θ > 0. The heart of the matter lies in a bifurcation problem. In the present paper we address and solve
this problem in a basic one-dimensional case. More precisely, we ﬁx a compact interval I = [a,b] ⊂R
and assume that the optimal solution to the control problem (1.8)–(1.9) determines a dynamics
x˙ = G1
(
x,u∗1(x),0
)
having a unique, asymptotically stable equilibrium point x¯ in the interior of I . Our main result shows
that, under generic conditions, for θ > 0 small the differential game (1.5)–(1.6) can have either one or
inﬁnitely many solutions with stable dynamics, close to the solution found when θ = 0. To determine
which case actually occurs, it suﬃces to check the signs of two speciﬁc functions, computed at the
equilibrium point x¯, for θ = 0.
We believe that the present homotopy approach can provide a useful tool in the study of non-
cooperative differential games, which in the non-linear case are diﬃcult to analyze. As shown in
the related paper [3], a model with players of different strength can have a meaningful economic
interpretation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the statement of a bifur-
cation lemma, whose proof is worked out in Sections 3–5. In Section 6 we show that all the main
assumptions of the lemma are naturally satisﬁed by the Hamilton–Jacobi equations describing the
value functions for a non-cooperative differential game with one weak player. This yields existence
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librium.
More details on the solution of Hamilton–Jacobi equations determined by differential games, and
two worked out examples of the present bifurcation approach, can be found in the companion pa-
per [3]. For a comprehensive introduction to bifurcation theory we refer to [8,10].
2. Bifurcation lemmas
We consider an implicit ODE of the form(
G θ2α
β G
)(
ξ ′
η′
)
=
(
φ
ψ
)
. (2.1)
Here all functions G,α,β,φ,ψ are smooth functions of x, ξ, η, θ , while θ  0. Furthermore, we as-
sume that for θ = 0 the functions G, φ do not depend on the variable η. More precisely, their partial
derivatives w.r.t. θ satisfy
(A1) As θ → 0, one has
∥∥Gη(x, ξ,η, θ)∥∥C1 = O(1) · θ2, ∥∥φη(x, ξ,η, θ)∥∥C1 = O(1) · θ2. (2.2)
Here and in the sequel, the Landau symbol O(1) denotes a quantity which remains uniformly
bounded as x, ξ, η, θ range in compact sets.
Consider a point P = (x¯, ξ¯ , η¯) where G = φ = 0. When θ = 0, a solution of (2.1) passing through P
can be constructed in two steps. We ﬁrst ﬁnd a solution ξ = ξ(x) to the problem
G(x, ξ)ξ ′ = φ(x, ξ), ξ(x¯) = ξ¯ . (2.3)
Notice that this does not depend on η, because of (A1). Assuming that at the point P one has ψ −
βξ ′(x¯) = 0, we then solve the second equation
G
(
x, ξ(x)
)
η′ = ψ(x, ξ(x),η)− β(x, ξ(x),η)ξ ′(x). (2.4)
We now introduce additional assumptions, that will enable us to construct solutions of (2.1) also
for θ > 0.
(A2) There exists a point P
.= (x¯, ξ¯ , η¯) such that, when θ = 0,
G(x¯, ξ¯ ) = φ(x¯, ξ¯ ) = 0, Gξ (x¯, ξ¯ ) = 0, (2.5)
and at P the matrix (
Gx Gξ
φx φξ
)
(2.6)
has two real distinct eigenvalues: λ− < 0 < λ+ , with |λ−| < λ+ . Moreover, calling Σ− .= {(x, ξ); ξ = ξ ′−x}
the stable eigenspace corresponding to the eigenvalue λ− , at P one has
βξ ′− −ψ = 0, (2.7)
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ξ ′−βη −ψη < 0. (2.8)
Notice that the shorter notation used in (2.5) is meaningful, because when θ = 0 the functions
G, φ do not depend on η. An explicit computation yields
λ± =
φξ + Gx ±
√
(φξ − Gx)2 + 4φxGξ
2
. (2.9)
The corresponding eigenvectors r−, r+ of the Jacobian matrix (2.6) are given by
r±
.=
(
1
ξ ′±
)
, ξ ′± =
λ± − Gx
Gξ
. (2.10)
Finally, we make an assumption of global nature:
(A3) When θ = 0, the stable solution x → W (x) .= (ξ(x), η(x)) passing through P = (x¯, ξ¯ , η¯) is well deﬁned
on a neighborhood of the compact interval I
.= [a,b] containing x¯ in the interior, and
G
(
x, ξ(x)
)
> 0 if a x< x¯,
G
(
x, ξ(x)
)
< 0 if x¯< x b. (2.11)
The following bifurcation lemmas describe what happens for θ > 0 small. The uniqueness or non-
uniqueness of bifurcating solutions depends on the sign of the product α · β , at the singular point
(x, ξ, η, θ) = (x¯, ξ¯ , η¯,0).
Lemma 1. Let G, φ,ψ,α,β be smooth functions, satisfying (A1)–(A3). Assume that, when θ = 0, at the point
(x¯, ξ¯ , η¯) one has αβ > 0.
Then, under the generic transversality assumption (A4) in Section 4, for each θ > 0 suﬃciently small the
ODE (2.1) has a unique smooth solution W θ (x) = (ξθ (x), ηθ (x)) globally deﬁned for x ∈ I , and satisfying
lim
θ→0
∥∥W θ − W ∥∥C0(I) = 0. (2.12)
Each solution W θ leads to a stable dynamics. Namely, there exists an equilibrium point x¯θ such that
G
(
x, ξ θ (x),ηθ (x), θ
)
> 0 if a x< x¯θ ,
G
(
x, ξ θ (x),ηθ (x), θ
)
< 0 if x¯θ < x b. (2.13)
Lemma 2. Let G, φ,ψ,α,β be smooth functions, satisfying (A1)–(A3). Assume that, when θ = 0, at the point
(x¯, ξ¯ , η¯) one has αβ < 0.
Then for each θ > 0 suﬃciently small, the ODE (2.1) has inﬁnitely many smooth solutions W θ (x) =
(ξθ (x), ηθ (x)) globally deﬁned for x ∈ I , all determining a stable dynamics as in (2.13). One can select so-
lutions W˜ θ (·) such that
lim
θ→0
∥∥W˜ θ − W ∥∥C0(I) = 0. (2.14)
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achieved in Sections 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
Step 1. For each θ > 0 small, we construct a solution Z θ to the implicit system{
G
(
x, ξ, η¯θ , θ
)
ξ ′ = φ(x, ξ, η¯θ , θ),
β(x, ξ,η, θ)ξ ′ + G(x, ξ, η¯θ , θ)η′ = ψ(x, ξ,η, θ), (2.15)
passing through the singular point P θ = (x¯θ , ξ¯ θ , η¯θ ) implicitly deﬁned by the system⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
G = 0,
φ = 0,
βξ ′− −ψ = 0.
(2.16)
Show that, as θ → 0, one has Z θ → W uniformly on I .
Step 2. By a rescaling of variables, construct a local bifurcating solution W θ of the full system (2.1),
deﬁned in a small neighborhood of x¯.
Step 3. Show that this local solution W θ can be extended to the entire interval I , remaining close
to W . This goal will be achieved by comparing this extension with the solution Z θ constructed in the
ﬁrst step.
We remark that (2.1) can be also written as a Pfaﬃan system
ω1 = ω2 = 0, (2.17)
where the differential forms ω1,ω2 on R3 are deﬁned as{
ω1
.= −φ dx+ G dξ + θ2α dη,
ω2
.= −ψ dx+ β dξ + G dη.
The graph of a solution to (2.1) can thus be obtained by suitably concatenating trajectories of the
vector ﬁeld v corresponding to the wedge product ω1 ∧ω2. Namely,
v=
⎛⎝ G2 − θ2αβGφ − θ2αψ
Gψ − βφ
⎞⎠ . (2.18)
We conclude this section by providing an intuitive justiﬁcation for the results stated above. In
the case αβ < 0, it is easy to see that solutions cannot be unique. Indeed, for any ﬁxed θ > 0 the
determinant of the coeﬃcient matrix in (2.1) is uniformly positive. Hence the system is equivalent to(
ξ ′
η′
)
= 1
G2 − θ2αβ
(
G −θ2α
−β G
)(
φ
ψ
)
. (2.19)
This is a smooth system of ODE’s in standard form. Given any solution deﬁned on the compact interval
I = [a,b], one can construct inﬁnitely many nearby solutions, by slightly changing the initial data at
x = x¯. On the other hand, when αβ > 0, a globally deﬁned solution must cross the two surfaces where
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p− ∈ γ−θ with a point p+ ∈ γ+θ .
G = ±θ√αβ at points where φ = ±θ√α/βψ . Its graph must therefore contain a heteroclinic orbit of
the vector ﬁeld v in (2.18), connecting a point p+ on the curve
γ+θ =
{
(x, ξ,η); G = θ√αβ, φ = θψ√α/β} (2.20)
with some other point p− on the curve
γ−θ =
{
(x, ξ,η); G = −θ√αβ, φ = −θψ√α/β}. (2.21)
Under a generic transversality condition, see (A4) in Section 4 for a precise assumption, this hetero-
clinic orbit is unique and structurally stable (Fig. 1).
3. Construction of a singular solution
We begin by showing that, for every θ > 0 suﬃciently small, there exists a unique point P θ =
(x¯θ , ξ¯ θ , η¯θ ) where the three equations in (2.16) are satisﬁed.
We ﬁrst clarify the meaning of ξ ′− in the third equation. Given θ  0 and a point (x¯θ , ξ¯ θ , η¯θ )
where the ﬁrst two equations hold, we consider the functions G(x, ξ, η¯θ , θ), φ(x, ξ, η¯θ , θ) of the two
variables x, ξ only. The ﬁrst ODE in (2.15) will have a singular solution with slope
ξ ′−
.= ξ ′(x¯θ )= φξ − Gx ±
√
(φξ − Gx)2 + 4φxGξ
2Gξ
, (3.1)
computed as in (2.9)–(2.10). This is the coeﬃcient appearing in the third equation at (2.16). Of course,
ξ ′− now depends also on η¯θ and θ . By the assumption (A1), when θ = 0 we have
∂
∂η
ξ ′− = 0.
Therefore, the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of the functions in (2.16) takes the form
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∗ ∗ βηξ ′− −ψη
⎞⎠ .
By the assumption (A2), for all θ  0 suﬃciently small we can apply the implicit function theorem.
This yields unique values (x¯θ , ξ¯ θ , η¯θ ) close to (x¯, ξ¯ , η¯) such that the equations in (2.16) continue to
hold at the point (x¯θ , ξ¯ θ , η¯θ , θ).
To simplify the notation, throughout the following we shall assume that, for every θ , Eqs. (2.16)
are satisﬁed at the point
(
x¯θ , ξ¯ θ , η¯θ
)= (0,0,0).
This is clearly not restrictive, because it can always be achieved by using the auxiliary variables
x˜ = x− x¯θ , ξ˜ = ξ − ξ¯ θ , η˜ = η − η¯θ .
In particular, since a < x¯< b, this means we are taking a < 0< b.
The singular solution of (2.15) can now be obtained in two steps. First we construct a solution
ξ = ξθ (x) of
G(x, ξ,0, θ)ξ ′ = φ(x, ξ,0, θ)
with ξθ (0) = 0 and ξ ′θ (0) = ξ ′− as in (3.1). Then we insert this solution in the second equation of (2.15).
The component η = ηθ (x) is thus obtained by solving
G
(
x, ξθ (x),0, θ
)
η′ = ψ(x, ξθ (x),η, θ)− β(x, ξθ (x),η, θ)ξ ′θ (x). (3.2)
Since at the origin there holds ψ −βξ ′− = 0, the above equation has a smooth solution with ηθ (0) = 0.
We now observe that all functions G, φ,β,ψ depend smoothly on the parameter θ . Therefore
the singular solution Z θ = (ξθ , ηθ ) depends continuously on θ . In particular, as θ → 0, one has the
convergence Z θ → W uniformly on the domain I .
4. The inner region
To analyze the behavior of solutions of (2.1) in a neighborhood of the origin, we look at integral
curves of the corresponding vector ﬁeld v in (2.18).
A rescaling of coordinates will be useful, namely
X = x
θ
, Y = ξ
θ
, Z = η. (4.1)
We seek a Taylor approximation of the rescaled vector ﬁeld w = θ−1v in these new coordinates. For
a ﬁxed θ , deﬁne
α0
.= α(0,0,0, θ), β0 .= β(0,0,0, θ), ψ0 .= ψ(0,0,0, θ). (4.2)
We expand the functions G, φ,α,β,ψ at the point (x¯θ , ξ¯ θ , η¯θ , θ) = (0,0,0, θ) where Eqs. (2.16) hold.
Recalling the assumption (2.2) we obtain an approximation for the ﬁrst component of v in (2.18),
namely
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(
α0β0 + α0(βxx+ βξ ξ + βηη)+ β0(αxx+ αξ ξ + αηη)
)
+ O(1) · (|x| + |ξ |)(x2 + ξ2 + θ2|η|)+ O(1) · θ4η2
+ O(1) · θ2(x2 + ξ2 + η2). (4.3)
Here O(1) denotes a quantity whose C1 norm over any bounded set in the x, ξ, η-variables remains
bounded. In terms of the variables X, Y , Z , this yields
θ−2G2 − αβ = (GxX + Gξ Y )2 − (α0β0 + α0βη Z + β0αη Z)+ O(1) · θ, (4.4)
where O(1) denotes a quantity whose C1 norm over any bounded set in the X, Y , Z -variables remains
uniformly bounded as θ → 0. The second component of the vector ﬁeld v is computed in a similar
way, namely
Gφ − θ2αψ = (Gxx+ Gξ ξ)(φxx+ φξ ξ)
− θ2(α0ψ0 + α0(ψxx+ψξξ +ψηη)+ψ0(αxx+ αξ ξ + αηη))
+ O(1) · (|x| + |ξ |)(x2 + ξ2 + θ2|η|)+ O(1) · θ4η2
+ O(1) · θ2(x2 + ξ2 + η2). (4.5)
In terms of the variables X, Y , Z , this yields
θ−2Gφ − αψ = (GxX + Gξ Y )(φx X + φξ Y )− (α0β0 + α0ψη Z +ψ0αη Z)+ O(1) · θ. (4.6)
Finally, for the third component we obtain
Gψ − βφ = (Gxx+ Gξ ξ)ψ0 − (φxx+ φξ ξ)β0 + (Gxψη − φxβη)xη + (Gξψη − φξβη)ξη
+ O(1) · (x2 + ξ2)+ O(1) · (|x| + |ξ | + θ2)η2, (4.7)
θ−1(Gψ − βφ) = (GxX + Gξ Y )ψ0 − (φx X + φξ Y )β0 + (Gxψη − φxβη)X Z
+ (Gξψη − φξβη)Y Z + O(1) ·
(|X | + |Y |)Z2 + O(1) · θ. (4.8)
Writing the vector ﬁeld in invariant form
θ−1v= θ−1
(
vx
∂
∂x
+ vξ ∂
∂ξ
+ vη ∂
∂η
)
=wX ∂
∂ X
+wY ∂
∂Y
+wZ ∂
∂ Z
,
from (4.4)–(4.8) we obtain an expansion of the vector ﬁeld w
.= θ−1v w.r.t. the coordinates X, Y , Z ,
namely
w=
⎛⎝wXwY
wZ
⎞⎠=wQ +wR , (4.9)
where the lower order part is given by
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⎛⎝ (GxX + Gξ Y )2 − α0β0 − (α0βη + β0αη)Z(GxX + Gξ Y )(φx X + φξ Y )− α0ψ0 − (α0ψη +ψ0αη)Z
(Gxψ0 − φxβ0)X + (Gξψ0 − φξβ0)Y + (Gxψη − φxβη)X Z + (Gξψη − φξβη)Y Z
⎞⎠ .
(4.10)
The remainder term is estimated by
wR =
⎛⎝ O(1) · θO(1) · θ
O(1) · Z2 + O(1) · θ
⎞⎠ . (4.11)
We recall that the coeﬃcients Gx,Gξ , φx, φξ , . . . are all evaluated at (0,0,0, θ). We now consider two
cases.
Case 1. α0β0 > 0.
In this case, when θ = 0 there will be two curves Γ ±0 in the X, Y , Z -space where the vector ﬁeld w
vanishes. By (4.10)–(4.11) we can ﬁnd two points Q − = (X−, Y−,0) ∈ Γ −0 , Q + = (X+, Y+,0) ∈ Γ +0
lying on these curves. Indeed, the coordinates (X−, Y−) are found by solving the linear equations
GxX + Gξ Y =
√
α0β0, φx X + φξ Y =
√
α0
β0
ψ0. (4.12)
Recalling the identities
β0ξ
′− = ψ0,
(
Gx + Gξ ξ ′−
)
ξ ′− = φx + φξ ξ ′−, Gx + Gξ ξ ′− = λ−, (4.13)
we compute
X+ =
√
α0β0
λ−
, Y+ = ξ ′−X− =
√
α0
β0
ψ0
λ−
.
Moreover Q − = (X−, Y−,0) = (−X+,−Y+,0).
We now claim that, always for θ = 0, the straight line through the points Q −, Q + , deﬁned as
Λ = {(X, Y , Z); Y = ξ ′−X, Z = 0}, (4.14)
is an invariant set for the vector ﬁeld w= (wX ,wY ,wZ ).
By (4.13), along the line Λ we have wZ = 0. Moreover,
wY
wX
= (Gx + Gξ ξ
′−)(φx + φξ ξ ′−)X2 − α0ψ0
(Gx + Gξ ξ ′−)2X2 − α0β0
= (Gx + Gξ ξ
′−)2ξ ′−X2 − α0β0ξ ′−
(Gx + Gξ ξ ′−)2X2 − α0β0
= ξ ′−.
This proves our claim. In particular, the two equilibrium points Q −, Q + are connected by a hetero-
clinic orbit of the vector ﬁeld w.
To explicitly compute this orbit, we observe that, by (4.10),
X˙ = λ2−
(
X2 −ω2), ω .=√α0β0/λ2−. (4.15)
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X(t) = 1− e
2ωλ2−t
1+ e2ωλ2−t
ω. (4.16)
Hence the heteroclinic orbit is
h(t) = 1− e
2ωλ2−t
1+ e2ωλ2−t
ω ·
⎛⎝ 1ξ ′−
0
⎞⎠ . (4.17)
Finally, we need to check whether this heteroclinic orbit is unique and structurally stable. For
P̂ ∈R3, call t → St( P̂ ) the solution to the Cauchy problem
P˙ =w(P ), P (0) = P̂ .
Consider the 2-dimensional stable manifold through the curve Γ −0 of stationary points, namely
Γ −stable
.=
{
P ∈R3; lim
t→+∞ St(P ) ∈ Γ
−
0
}
.
Similarly, consider the 2-dimensional unstable manifold through the curve Γ +0 of stationary points,
namely
Γ +unstable
.=
{
P ∈R3; lim
t→−∞ St(P ) ∈ Γ
+
0
}
.
By the previous analysis, the segment joining Q − with Q + is contained in the intersection Γ −stable ∩
Γ +unstable. This heteroclinic orbit is structurally stable provided that the stable and unstable manifolds
intersect transversally. To study this question, we linearize the vector ﬁeld w around h(·). This yields
the system
p˙ = A(t)p, (4.18)
where, by (4.13) and (4.16),
A(t) =
⎛⎝ 2λ−GxX(t) 2λ−Gξ X(t) −(α0βη + β0αη)λ−(φx + ξ ′−Gx)X(t) λ−(φξ + ξ ′−Gξ )X(t) −(α0ψη +ψ0αη)
Gxψ0 − φxβ0 Gξψ0 − φξβ0 (ψη − ξ ′−βη)λ−X(t)
⎞⎠ . (4.19)
The intersection Γ −stable ∩Γ +unstable is transversal provided that the following (generically true) assump-
tion holds:
(A4) The linear system (4.18)–(4.19) has no non-trivial globally bounded solutions.
Here by a “trivial solution” we mean a solution which is proportional to the time derivative h˙. Of
course, this solution would yield the same orbit, up to a time reparametrization. Notice that (4.18)
always has the solution p(t) = h˙(t) = (1, ξ ′−,0) X˙(t). Moreover, if ψη − ξ ′−βη = 0, then (4.18) has non-
trivial bounded solutions of the form p˜(t) = ( X˜(t), ξ ′− X˜(t), η¯) for any constant η¯. Hence the condition
1308 A. Bressan / J. Differential Equations 248 (2010) 1297–1314ψη − ξ ′−βη = 0 is necessary (but possibly not suﬃcient) in order to achieve structural stability of the
heteroclinic orbit.
If the additional assumption (A4) holds, then the heteroclinic orbit is structurally stable. In par-
ticular, for each θ > 0 suﬃciently small, the vector ﬁeld w = wθ still has a unique heteroclinic orbit
joining a point Q −θ ∈ Γ −θ with a point Q +θ ∈ Γ +θ . Here Γ ±θ are the two curves where the vector
ﬁeld wθ vanishes. These correspond to the curves γ±θ in (2.20)–(2.21), after the change of variables
(x, ξ, η) → (X, Y , Z).
Case 2. α0β0 < 0.
In this case the vector ﬁeld w has no zeroes, and we can simply consider the trajectory passing
through the origin. We observe that, also in this case, when θ = 0 this trajectory is precisely the
line Λ deﬁned at (4.14).
In the next section we shall extend this inner solution to an outer domain. Following a standard
procedure in the theory of matched asymptotic expansions [12], we observe that the quadratic ap-
proximation remains valid not only for X, Y in bounded sets, but also on a somewhat larger domain.
Indeed, by the estimates (4.3), (4.5), and (4.7), it follows that as θ → 0 the vector ﬁeld w converges
to its quadratic approximation wQ in (4.10) on the wider domain {|X | + |Y | θ−1/3, |Z | θ1/2}. As a
consequence, as θ → 0 the smooth invariant set of the vector ﬁeld w which extends the unique het-
eroclinic orbit converges to the line Λ in (4.14) uniformly for |X |  θ−1/5. Returning to the original
coordinates, this implies that the corresponding functions x → ξθ (x), x → ηθ (x) satisfy
ξ(θ4/5)
θ4/5
− ξ ′− → 0, ηθ
(
θ4/5
)→ 0, as θ → 0. (4.20)
5. The outer region
Toward the proof of Lemmas 1 and 2, in this section we analyze the behavior of solutions of the
system (2.19) on an outer region. For θ  0, let Z θ (x) = (ξθ (x), ηθ (x)) be the solution of
ξ ′ = φ(x, ξ,0, θ)
G(x, ξ,0, θ)
, η′ = 1
G(x, ξ,0, θ)
(
ψ(x, ξ,η, θ) − φ(x, ξ,0, θ)
G(x, ξ,0, θ)
β(x, ξ,η, θ)
)
, (5.1)
constructed in Section 3, with initial data
ξ(0) = η(0) = 0. (5.2)
Calling ξ,η the ﬁrst-order variations to the above solution, by linearization we obtain
(ξ)′ = 1
G
(
φξ − φ
G
Gξ
)
ξ, (5.3)
(η)′ = 1
G
((
ψξ − φ
G
βξ
)
ξ +
(
ψη − φ
G
βη
)
η
)
+ 1
G2
(
2βφ
G
Gξ − βφξ −ψGξ
)
ξ. (5.4)
From the eigenvector equations for the matrix (2.6) it follows{
Gx + Gξ ξ ′− = λ−,
φx + φξ ξ ′− = λ−ξ ′−.
In turn, the above equations yield
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Gxφξ − Gξ φx = Gxφξ − Gξ (λ− − φξ )ξ ′− = λ−λ+,(
Gx + ξ ′−Gξ
)
φξ − λ−Gξ ξ ′− = λ−λ+,
φξ − Gξ ξ ′− = λ+ > 0.
We observe that along the reference solution Z θ we have
G = λ−x+ O
(
x2
)
, φ = λ−ξ ′−x+ O
(
x2
)
.
Eqs. (5.3)–(5.4) yield
(ξ)′ = λ+
λ−x
ξ + O(1)ξ, (5.5)
(η)′ = 1
λ−x
(
ψη − ξ ′−βη
)
η + O(1)η + O(1)
x2
ξ. (5.6)
Our main goal is to compare a solution W θ of the full system (2.19) with the singular solution Z θ
of (5.1)–(5.2), for x ∈ [θ1−δ, r]. Here δ > 0 and r > 0 are suﬃciently small constants, independent of θ .
From now on, we thus call (ξ,η) = W θ − Z θ . Compared with (5.3)–(5.4), the evolution equations
for ξ,η will now contain additional terms, due to the fact that W θ satisﬁes an equation somewhat
different from Z θ . To estimate these terms, at the point (x,W θ (x)), for 0< θ  x we compute
φ
G
− φG
G2 − θ2αβ +
θ2αψ
G2 − θ2αβ =
φ
G
(
1− G
2
G2 − θ2αβ
)
+ O(1) · θ
2
x2
= O(1) · θ
2
x2
. (5.7)
Moreover, by (2.2),
φ(x, ξ,0, θ)
G(x, ξ,0, θ)
− φ(x, ξ,η, θ)
G(x, ξ,η, θ)
= O(1) · θ2 η
G
= O(1) · θ2 η
x
, (5.8)(
ψ
G
− βφ
G2
)
−
(
Gψ
G2 − θ2αβ −
βφ
G2 − θ2αβ
)
= O(1) · θ
2
x3
. (5.9)
Taking these additional source terms into account, from (5.5)–(5.6) and (5.7)–(5.9) we obtain⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
(ξ)′ = λ+
λ−x
ξ + O(1)ξ + O(1) · θ
2
x2
,
(η)′ = 1
λ−x
(
ψη − ξ ′−βη
)
η + O(1)η + O(1)
x2
ξ + O(1) · θ
2
x3
.
(5.10)
The system (5.10) can be compared with the linear system of ODE’s⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
y′ = −A0
x
y + C y + C θ
2
x2
,
z′ = − B0
x
z + Cz + C y
x2
+ C θ
2
x3
,
(5.11)
where
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.= −λ+
λ−
> 1, B0
.= ψη − ξ−βη
λ−
> 0,
and C > 0 is a suﬃciently large constant. Taking 1 < A < A0, and 0 < B < min{B0,1}, for 0 < x < r
suﬃciently small the positive solutions of (5.11) can be majorized by solutions of the simpler system⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
y′ = −A
x
y + C θ
2
x2
,
z′ = − B
x
z + C y
x2
+ C θ
2
x3
.
(5.12)
Given positive initial data
x0 > 0, y(x0) = y0 > 0, z(x0) = z0 > 0,
on the interval [x0, r] the solution to the ﬁrst equation in (5.12) is computed as
y(x) =
(
x0
x
)A
y(x0)+
x∫
x0
(
t
x
)A Cθ2
t2
dt
=
(
x0
x
)A
y(x0)+ Cθ
2
xA
(
xA−1 − xA−10
A − 1
)
<
(
x0
x
)A
y(x0)+ Cθ
2
(A − 1)x . (5.13)
Inserting (5.13) in the second equation in (5.12), we ﬁnd
z(x) =
(
x0
x
)B
z(x0)+
x∫
x0
(
t
x
)B(C y(t)
t2
+ Cθ
2
t3
)
dt
<
(
x0
x
)B
z(x0)+
x∫
x0
(
t
x
)B( CxA0
t2+A
y(x0)+ C
′θ2
t3
)
dt
<
(
x0
x
)B
z(x0)+ Cx
A
0 x
B−1−A
0
(A + 1− B)xB y(x0)+
C ′θ2xB−20
(2− B)xB
 z(x0)+ C
(A + 1− B)x0 y(x0)+
C ′θ2
(2− B)x20
, (5.14)
for a suitable constant C ′ > C . By (5.13)–(5.14), if we choose δ > 0 and a family of initial data depend-
ing on the parameter θ , so that
x0,θ = θ1−δ, yθ (x0,θ )
x0,θ
→ 0, zθ (x0,θ ) → 0, (5.15)
then the corresponding solutions (yθ , zθ ) deﬁned on the intervals [θ1−δ, r] will converge to zero
uniformly, as θ → 0.
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structed in Section 4 in the inner region are suﬃciently close to the singular solutions Z θ = (ξ Zθ , ηZθ )
constructed in Section 3. By the estimates (4.20), we can choose δ = 1/5 and check that, as θ → 0,
ξWθ (θ
4/5)− ξ Zθ (θ4/5)
θ4/5
→ 0, ηWθ
(
θ4/5
)− ηZθ (θ4/5)→ 0. (5.16)
A comparison with a solution pair (yθ , zθ ) of (5.12) shows that∣∣ξWθ (x)− ξ Zθ (x)∣∣ yθ (x), ∣∣ηWθ (x) − ηZθ (x)∣∣ zθ (x),
for x ∈ [θ4/5, r]. Since we already know the uniform convergence Z θ → W , this yields the convergence
W θ → W on [0, r]. On the remaining subinterval [r,b] the ODE (2.19) has no singularities, hence the
convergence W θ → W is clear. By an entirely similar argument one can establish the convergence
W θ → W for x ∈ [a,0].
6. Application to differential games
In this section we show how the previous bifurcation results can be applied to the analysis of
the non-cooperative differential game (1.5)–(1.6). For more details, and two worked out examples, we
refer to the companion paper [3]. Call V1, V2 the value functions for the two players, and denote by
ξ = V ′1, η = V ′2 their gradients. The optimal feedback controls for the two players are thus provided
by
u∗1(x, ξ1, θ) = argmin
ω
{
ξ1 · G1(x,ω, θ) + L11(x,ω, θ)
}
, (6.1)
u∗2(x, ξ2, θ) = argmin
ω
{
ξ2 · θG2(x,ω, θ) + L22(x,ω, θ)
}
. (6.2)
We shall assume
(A1′) All functions Gi , L ji are smooth. Moreover, the minima (6.1)–(6.2) are always attained at points where
the hessians are strictly positive deﬁnite, hence the functions u∗1,u∗2 depend smoothly on all their arguments.
Calling
Gi(x, ξi, θ) = Gi
(
x,u∗i (x, ξi, θ), θ
)
, L ji(x, ξi, θ) = L ji
(
x,u∗i (x, ξi, θ), θ
)
,
the hamiltonian functions take the form
H (i)(x, ξ1, ξ2, θ) = ξi ·
(
G1(x, ξ1, θ)+ θG2(x, ξ2, θ)
)+ Li1(x, ξ1, θ)+ Li2(x, ξ2, θ).
Differentiating (1.4) w.r.t. x we obtain the equations
ρξi = H (i)x + H (i)ξ1 ξ ′1 + H
(i)
ξ2
ξ ′2, i = 1,2,
which we write as (
H (1)ξ1 H
(1)
ξ2
H (2) H (2)
)(
ξ ′1
ξ ′
)
=
(
ρξ1 − H (1)x
ρξ2 − H (2)
)
. (6.3)ξ1 ξ2
2 x
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H (1)ξ1 = H
(2)
ξ2
= G, θ2α = H (1)ξ2 , β = H
(2)
ξ1
, φ = ρξ1 − H (1)x , ψ = ρξ2 − H (2)x . (6.4)
When θ = 0, the second player now cannot affect the evolution of the system. His best choice
is the myopic strategy u2 = u†2(x) in (1.7), depending only on the present state of the system. In
particular, in this case H(1) does not depend on ξ2. From the assumption (A1′) it follows ∂u∗2/∂ξ2 =O(1) · θ . This implies
∂G
∂ξ2
= ∂
∂ξ2
(G1 + θG2) = θ ∂G
∂u2
∂u∗2
∂ξ2
= O(1) · θ2. (6.5)
Furthermore, if the payoff function L12 has the form
L12(x, ξ2, θ) = (1− θ )˜L12
(
x,u†2(x)
)+ θ L˜12(x,u∗2(x, ξ2, θ)), (6.6)
then
∂L12
∂ξ2
= θ · ∂ L˜12
∂u2
∂u∗2
∂ξ2
= O(1) · θ2. (6.7)
By the smoothness assumptions, we can thus write H (1)ξ2 = θ2α for some bounded, smooth function
α = α(x, ξ1, ξ2, θ). The above analysis also yields
‖Gξ2‖C1 =
∥∥H (1)ξ1ξ2∥∥C1 = O(1) · θ2, ‖φξ2‖C1 = ∥∥H (1)ξ2x∥∥C1 = O(1) · θ2, (6.8)
hence the basic assumption (A1) in Section 2 is satisﬁed.
The remaining conditions (A2)–(A3) refer to the optimal control problem (1.8)–(1.9) for the ﬁrst
player, when θ = 0 and the second player adopts the myopic strategy. These will be satisﬁed, imposing
a natural stability condition on the dynamics generated by the optimal feedback.
(A2′)When θ = 0, the value function V1 for the optimal control problem (1.8)–(1.9) is smooth on a neighbor-
hood of the interval I = [a,b]. Moreover, there exists a stable equilibrium point a < x¯< b such that the optimal
feedback control u∗1 satisﬁes{
G1
(
x,u∗1(x)
)
> 0 if a x< x¯,
G1
(
x,u∗1(x)
)
< 0 if x¯< x b,
d
dx
G1
(
x,u∗1(x)
)∣∣∣∣
x=x¯
< 0. (6.9)
The corresponding value function V2 for the second player is also smooth, on a neighborhood of [a,b].
To check that the assumptions in (A2′) imply the conditions (A2)–(A3), consider the ODE{
x˙ = H (1)ξ1 (x, ξ1),
ξ˙1 = ρξ1 − H (1)x (x, ξ1).
(6.10)
At the equilibrium point (x¯, ξ¯1), the corresponding matrix of partial derivatives is(
H (1)xξ1 H
(1)
ξ1ξ1
−H (1) ρ − H (1)
)
. (6.11)xx xξ1
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λ± = ρ
2
±
√
ρ2
4
+ (H (1)xξ1 − ρ)H (1)xξ1 − H (1)xx H (1)ξ1ξ1 . (6.12)
Recalling that H(1)ξ1 = G1 and assuming that the stability condition (6.9) holds, from (6.12) it follows
that these eigenvalues are real and distinct, satisfying
λ− < 0< λ+, |λ−| < λ+. (6.13)
The stationary point (x¯, ξ¯1) is thus a hyperbolic (saddle) point for the ODE (6.10). The corresponding
eigenvectors r± of the matrix in (6.11) can be written as
r± =
(
1
ξ ′±
)
, ξ ′± =
λ± − H (1)xξ1
H (1)ξ1ξ1
. (6.14)
The derivative of the value function x → ξ1(x) .= V ′1(x) thus satisﬁes
ξ1(x¯) = ξ¯1, ξ ′1(x¯) = ξ ′−.
By (A2′), always for θ = 0, the value function V2 for the second player is also smooth. Therefore,
calling ξ¯2 = V ′2(x¯), at the point (x, ξ1, ξ2, θ) = (x¯, ξ¯1, ξ¯2,0) the following equations hold:⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
G = H (1)ξ1 = H
(2)
ξ2
= 0,
φ = ρξ1 − H (1)x = 0,
βξ ′− −ψ = H (2)ξ1 ξ ′− −
(
ρξ2 − H (2)x
)= 0. (6.15)
The last equation in (6.15) corresponds to (2.7). Furthermore, by the last inequality in (6.9) it follows
βξ2ξ
′− −ψξ2 = H (2)ξ1ξ2
d
dx
ξ1(x)−
(
ρξ2 − H (2)x
)
ξ2
= ∂G1
∂ξ1
ξ ′− − ρ +
∂G1
∂x
< 0.
Hence the assumption (2.8) holds as well.
Applying the bifurcation Lemmas 1 and 2 to the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations (6.3), we
obtain some information on the existence and multiplicity of Nash feedback solutions to the non-
cooperative differential game (1.5)–(1.6), for θ > 0 small.
Theorem 1. For the differential game (1.5)–(1.6), let the assumptions (A1′)–(A2′) hold.
(i) If H(1)ξ2 H
(2)
ξ1
< 0, then for each θ > 0 small there exist inﬁnitely many Nash equilibrium feedback solu-
tions, on the interval [a,b]. One can choose a family of solutions θ → (u∗1(x, θ),u∗2(x, θ)) approaching
u∗1(x,0),u
†
2(x) as θ → 0, uniformly for x ∈ [a,b]. All these solutions yield a stable dynamics.
(ii) If H(1)ξ2 H
(2)
ξ1
> 0 and the generic condition (A4) holds, then for each θ > 0 small the differential game
admits a unique Nash equilibrium feedback solution close to u∗(x,0),u†2(x). These solutions yield a stable
dynamics, and converge to u∗1(x,0),u
†
2(x) as θ → 0, uniformly for x ∈ [a,b].
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The present results can be regarded as a ﬁrst step in a research program, studying non-cooperative
differential games as perturbations of optimal control problems. In a basic one-dimensional case,
we showed that bifurcation techniques can be effective, providing a qualitative understanding of the
problem. The following issues seem worth of further investigation:
(i) Do the results remain valid, if one replaces the second assumption in (2.2) with the weaker
condition ‖φη‖ = O(1) · θ? This apparently would apply to a wider range of economic models.
(ii) Can one identify a class of problems where the generic non-degeneracy assumption (A4) is auto-
matically satisﬁed?
(iii) Assume that, for θ = 0, the optimal feedback control u1 = u∗1(x) for the ﬁrst player yields a more
complex dynamics, say with two basins of attractions separated by a point where the feedback
is discontinuous. Can one still ﬁnd Nash equilibrium solutions by a perturbation argument, for
θ > 0 small?
In addition, it would be of interest to extend the present bifurcation approach to differential games
with multi-dimensional state space.
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